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Abstract: This article addresses the way in which the Argentine Supreme Court has set 
out to redefi ne its own institutional role through its procedures and decisions, since its 
institutional reform in 2003. It shows that the Court has developed innovative ways 
of judicial intervention in public policy and rights issues, which include the participa-
tion of new kinds of actors and entail an emerging new relationship between the Court 
and civil society organizations in Argentina. The article argues that this change can be 
understood as a way for the Court to rebuild its institutional legitimacy, and that the 
reform is connected to the presence of strong nongovernmental organizations whose 
claims for a change in the Court’s composition and procedures gained momentum in the 
aftermath of the social and political crisis of 2001–2002 in Argentina.
The Argentine Supreme Court has been analyzed by judicial politics studies 
that have repeatedly portrayed its behavior as dependent on political competi-
tion (Chavez 2004; Helmke 2003; Scribner 2004; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 
2002).1 In this framework, the most signifi cant changes in the Court’s actions are 
determined by either of the two main indicators of party competition—the pres-
ence of unifi ed or divided government, or the existence of uncertainty regarding 
electoral results—which affect the relative power of the executive and, in turn, 
its capacity to infl uence the Court. These studies have focused on the Court’s in-
dependence and have addressed, among other periods, the work of the Court 
during the 1990s, a time in which its deference to the party in power led to its 
depiction as one of the most dependent courts in Latin America (Helmke 2003), 
and a time in which many of its decisions entailed fl agrant violations of contract 
rights and the Constitution (Acuña 2002; Gargarella 2002).
However, after a legitimacy crisis that placed the Court at the center of popular 
protests during the social and political crisis of 2001–2002 in Argentina, the Court 
was reformed, and a new period started (see Brinks 2005). By looking at how 
it set out to develop its work after this reform, this article argues that it is pos-
I am grateful to Matilde J. Farren, Héctor Fix-Fierro, Daniel Brinks, Juan G. Bertomeu, and Jonathan 
Miller for their comments and help. I also thank the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM), and in particular the Institute of Legal Research, for the opportunity to carry out this work.
1. An exception is the work by Brinks (2005), who addresses the reform of the Court in 2003 and the 
consequences of new mechanisms for appointing judges on the Court’s behavior. The author claims that 
this reform had a positive impact on the Court’s independence.
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sible to have both a different picture of and an additional rationale for the Court’s 
behavior. It shows that after the process of Supreme Court reform and renewal 
initiated in Argentina in 2003, the Court has actively intervened in public policy 
and rights issues and that in some emblematic cases it has done so through proce-
dures that are innovative in the Argentine context. This article focuses not on the 
Court’s autonomy but on the redefi nition of its institutional role and on its new 
approaches to decision making, and it argues that these developments cannot be 
fully understood under the political competition rationale but can be attributed 
to the Court’s need to recover its institutional legitimacy in a context marked by 
the presence of active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that had pushed 
for reforms and, later on, infl uenced the Court’s agenda and procedures in the 
aftermath of the crisis.
A new relationship between the Court and civil society started just after the 
Court’s renewal in 2003, when it implemented a series of reforms to its own in-
ternal procedures that a group of NGOs had proposed with the explicit aim of 
increasing the Court’s legitimacy. These institutional reforms fostered public 
participation and accountability in the Court’s decision making and created new 
opportunities for strategic litigation and intervention in its procedures by civil 
society organizations. Afterward, some of those NGOs presented rights claims in 
cases that the Court upheld and that implied a new approach to judicial decisions. 
These cases involved violations of collective and individual rights that were ad-
dressed from the perspective of the structural reform of institutions (Puga 2008) 
and present some of the elements of the so-called experimental approach in pub-
lic interest litigation.2 This is only an emerging trend in Argentina, but it is one 
that implies an innovation in the country’s judicial practices and that the Court 
and rights advocacy organizations have consciously pursued in recent years.
The interaction between citizens and the Court has taken place mainly around 
a new understanding of the Court’s institutional role in terms of its responsive-
ness to civil society, its intervention in new types of cases, and the introduction 
of more accountability and transparency in its procedures. These changes have 
been possible because new justices joined the Court and replaced judges whose 
actions, as mentioned herein, were systematically identifi ed with the protection of 
political actors’ interests to the detriment of citizens’ rights. Certainly, the policy 
preferences of the new justices may have also played a fundamental role in recent 
decisions by the Court, which have differed radically from those of the 1990s. 
However, beyond justices’ preferences for policy outcomes, this article claims 
that to understand why the Court engaged in an unprecedented relationship 
with actors in civil society and why it implemented innovative decision-making 
approaches, it is necessary to look at the incentives that emerged from the par-
ticular context that preceded the Court’s reform. The argument here is that judges 
developed this type of intervention because they were concerned about the in-
stitutional standing and legitimacy of the Court, after a crisis of credibility that 
made it a focal point of social outburst during the country’s political breakdown 
in 2001–2002. This explanation is in consonance with strategic accounts of judicial 
2. I am thankful to Daniel Brinks for this observation.
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behavior (notably, Epstein and Knight 1998) that affi rm that one of the main con-
cerns of judges is maintaining the legitimacy of courts. Legitimacy is understood 
here as the institutional power of courts, which is associated with so-called dif-
fuse support from the public and is based on the recognition of courts as mean-
ingful and respected actors in their political systems.3 The search for legitimacy, 
and its consequences for assumptions about justices’ behavior, can be considered 
an even more pressing endeavor for new or recently reformed courts that need to 
build their reputation and enforcement power from scratch or in the aftermath of 
serious institutional crises, as happened in Argentina.
The fi rst section of this article presents a brief account of the Court’s reform 
process, with an emphasis on the new institutional procedures that were pro-
posed by NGOs and implemented by the Court. The second section addresses de-
cisions and procedures of the Court that indicate a redefi nition of its institutional 
role. The focus is not so much on the Court’s jurisprudence, which is nonetheless 
mentioned, but on new approaches to judicial decision making. The third section 
shows how the interaction between the Court and NGOs, in the aftermath of a 
legitimacy crisis, contributes to understanding this recent development.
THE COURT’S REFORM AND THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
IN ITS PROCEDURES
Scholars of the Argentine Supreme Court before reform decried its loss of in-
stitutional standing and authority throughout its institutional history (e.g., Carrió 
1996; Miller 1997). Overall, the Court was questioned for not having contributed 
to the maintenance of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and es-
pecially for having consented to the delegation of powers to the executive branch, 
thus fostering hyper-presidentialism (Nino 1993) and undermining its own role 
in the protection of rights (Gargarella 1998). Furthermore, the lack of transparency 
of the Court’s internal procedures limited the possibilities of public debate about 
its decisions and contributed to the lack of social recognition of its institutional 
role (Carrió 1996; Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales [CELS] et al. 2003; Miller 
1997). These tendencies were aggravated during the 1990s, under the presidency 
of Carlos Menem.4 This decade was characterized by political control over the 
Court and blatant corruption scandals involving some of its justices (see Acuña 
2002; Brinks 2005; Carrió 1996; Miller 1997). Regarding its jurisprudence, it has 
been observed that the so-called Menemist Court exercised a certain type of ac-
tivism that was opposed to what is commonly understood as judicial activism in 
constitutional theory, as it was not oriented toward the protection of “individual 
rights in confl ict with governmental interests, but to the defense of the latter” 
3. According to Fallon (2005, 1228), the institutional legitimacy of a judicial organ such as a supreme 
court “resides in public beliefs that it is a generally trustworthy decision maker whose rulings there-
fore deserve respect and obedience.” As the author observes, this type of legitimacy has usually been 
equated with diffuse support from the public to a court as an institution, in contrast to specifi c support 
to a particular court’s decisions (see, e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992).
4. At the beginning of his government in 1990, Menem appointed a group of justices to the Court 
popularly called the automatic majority, as they systematically upheld presidential decisions.
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(Carrió 1996, 160). Moreover, Gargarella (1998) argues that the Court in the 1990s 
not only systematically defended the particular interests of the executive but also 
developed a solid, conservative jurisprudence, supporting policies that were just 
opposite to egalitarian political and economic trends. Finally, the illegitimate ex-
pansion of the Court’s jurisdiction during that decade further contributed to the 
undermining of its credibility and legitimacy (Carrió 1996; CELS et al. 2003).5
By the end of the 1990s the Supreme Court went through the most serious 
legitimacy crisis in its institutional history (Prillaman 2000; Sabsay 2004). In the 
context of the political and economic crisis of 2001–2002, social insurrection was 
unprecedentedly directed at the Court as being co-responsible for the country’s 
breakdown.6 In January 2002, in the midst of the crisis, a group of NGOs whose 
work is related to rights litigation and government accountability gathered to pro-
pose solutions to the situation of the Court.7 Under the dictum “A Court for De-
mocracy,” these organizations developed a comprehensive program for Supreme 
Court reform to be implemented by the three branches of government (CELS et al. 
2002a, 2002b, 2003). The fi rst of these documents expressed that the main aim of 
the proposals was to recover the Court’s legitimacy (CELS et al. 2002a, 1). With 
regard to the types of changes that were recommended, a member of one of the 
organizations explained that “they had to do with the tools that NGOs have al-
ways dealt with: disclosure and transparency.”8
One set of proposals emphasized the need for new, more transparent, and par-
ticipative procedures for the removal and designation of new justices, considering 
that the Court’s renewal was necessary given its complete lack of legitimacy (CELS 
et al. 2002b). These reforms were fully implemented by the executive branch and 
the Senate during the fi rst months of the government of Néstor Kirchner, who 
took offi ce in May 2003 as the fi rst democratically elected president after the cri-
sis.9 Through the application of the new procedures, which gathered vast public 
attention (Brinks 2005), four new justices were appointed to replace the most pub-
lically denounced members of the Court.10 It has been argued that these reforms 
5. The Court’s jurisdiction was broadened under Menem’s government by two means: by reducing 
the minimum damages for which a party can sue in cases in which the national administration is a 
party, and by giving jurisdiction to the Court as a third level of appeal in pension law cases. Justice 
Eugenio Zaffaroni explained that allowing for the Court’s jurisdiction in pension law issues was uncon-
stitutional (author interview, Buenos Aires, July 4, 2005).
6. See “Por primera vez, la Corte estuvo en el centro de una protesta social,” Clarín, December 30, 
2001; “Por paliza, para que se vayan todos,” Página/12, October 13, 2002.
7. These organizations were Poder Ciudadano, the Center for Legal and Social Studies, the Institute 
of Comparative Criminal and Social Studies, the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation, the 
Association for Civil Rights, and the Union of Consumers.
8. María Julia Pérez Tort, coordinator of the Action for Justice area, Foundation Poder Ciudadano 
(author interview, Buenos Aires, April 21, 2005).
9. Presidential Decree No. 222/03, of June 19, 2003, established new mechanisms of disclosure and 
public scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees’ professional and ethical backgrounds as well as formal 
mechanisms for civil society to express its opinions about and objections to the nominees. On July 2, 
2003, the Senate introduced more transparency and public participation in its procedures for confi rma-
tion hearings.
10. The new justices are Eugenio Zaffaroni (confi rmed by the Senate in October 2003), Carmen Argi-
bay (confi rmed in July 2004), Elena Highton (confi rmed in June 2004, and the fi rst woman to join the 
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have so far contributed to the Court’s independence (Brinks 2005) and legitimacy 
(Litvachky and Zayat 2007).
The other group of proposals referred to the internal functioning of the Court 
and entailed reforms oriented to “achieve greater transparency in the Court’s ac-
tivity and increase its legitimacy and credibility” (CELS et al. 2003, 2). The pro-
posed changes were to limit the Court’s competences and the amount of cases it 
deals with each year; to prohibit meetings between Court members and only one 
of the parties involved in a case; to disclose the circulation of case fi les within the 
Court; to actively implement public hearings, which were included in the Argen-
tine constitutional system but seldom had been used before the Court’s reform; 
to rapidly publish complete Court decisions; and to publish justices’ declarations 
of their assets, in compliance with the Law of Public Ethics from which they had 
exempted themselves in 2000. Finally, these proposals pointed to the need for 
justices to pay income taxes, from which members of the Court had also exempted 
themselves in 1996.
After its reform, the Court entered into unprecedented relationships with ac-
tors in civil society and implemented almost all the reforms that the aforemen-
tioned NGOs had proposed. In November 2003, soon after being elected president 
of the Court, Judge Enrique Petracchi received the members of those NGOs, who 
presented him with the document about internal reforms of the Court, with which 
he “complete[ly] agreed and committed himself to gradually implement[ing].”11 
Later on, Judge Eugenio Zaffaroni met with these organizations to discuss the 
same type of proposals, which he also supported. The president of one of those 
NGOs said, “The fact that Zaffaroni was aware of the proposals presented in ‘Una 
Corte para la democracia I y II’ and shared in detail many of the issues discussed 
in that document is encouraging for the prospects of the reconstruction of the 
bridges, so many times broken, between civil society and the Court.”12
At the end of December 2003, the Court set out to implement the proposed re-
forms through a series of internal agreements (acordadas) that increased transpar-
ency and accountability in its own procedures.13 In particular, it established the 
disclosure of the circulation of case fi les among the different Court justices;14 dif-
ferent treatment for cases of institutional signifi cance, including the need to fi x the 
date on which the Court would consider them,15 and the full-text publication of the 
Court’s signifi cant decisions.16 The Court also stipulated that any meeting between 
litigants and justices must take place in the presence of the other party as well.17 
In addition, the Court promoted the participation of civil society in its decision-
Court under a democratic government), and Ricardo Lorenzetti (confi rmed in December 2004 and 
elected chief justice in November 2006).
11. Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales), 
Boletín Informativo No. 15, December 2, 2003, http://www.farn.org.ar/docs/boletin/boletin015.html.
12. Mario Rejtman, in Infocívica, Poder Ciudadano, June 5, 2003, http://www.infocivica.org.ar.
13. The complete text of these agreements can be found at the website Corte Suprema de Justicia de la 
Nación, at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/docus/documentos/cons_tipo.jsp?tipo=AC (accessed June 27, 2012).
14. Acordada 35/2003, December 11.
15. Acordada 36/2003, December 18.
16. Acordada 37/2003, December 18.
17. Acordada 7/2004, February 24.
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 making processes, mainly by regulating public hearings18 and amicus curiae sub-
missions.19 In 2006 the Court established that all cases that allow the presentation of 
amicus briefs would be published on the Court’s web page.20 The Court also ruled 
that its members should disclose their assets.21 The only recommendation that the 
Court has not complied with so far is the payment of income taxes.22 Finally, as 
described in the following section, through decisions in particular cases, the Court 
reduced its scope of competences in order to adjust them to its constitutional role.
INNOVATION IN JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ROLE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT
After the mentioned institutional reforms, the Court itself has redefi ned its 
own institutional role through new decision-making procedures; through limit-
ing its competences; and through its intervention, for the fi rst time, in structural 
reform cases. In effect, the Court’s decisions on rights and public policy issues 
not only have brought about a change with respect to the Court’s jurisprudence 
during the 1990s, but in some of these cases, the Court has also implemented new 
methods of judicial enforcement that have started to redefi ne its approach to deci-
sion making and its relationship with civil society. In addition, in many instances 
the Court has set an agenda that the other powers of government (i.e., executive 
and legislative) had not advanced, and it has pushed other powers to act to com-
ply with constitutional rights and guarantees.
As part of this movement toward a new standing in the political system, the 
Court also created three new areas within its institutional structure that are not 
directly related to its case law decisions but are worth mentioning because they 
imply a new conception of its role as well as of its relationships with society. In 
2008 and 2009, respectively, the Court established the Offi ce of Domestic Violence, 
which aims to facilitate access of victims of violence to the judicial system, and the 
Women’s Offi ce, oriented toward introducing a gender perspective into the judi-
ciary.23 Also in 2008, it created the Center of Judicial Information, which produces 
information about the judiciary and publishes it at the Court’s website.24
18. Acordada 30/2007. Public hearings at the Supreme Court were a mechanism included in the Argen-
tine constitutional system, but they were not formalized and had hardly been used before the Court’s 
reform.
19. Acordada 28/2004, July 14.
20. Acordada 14/2006, May 3.
21. Acordada 29/2005, December 27.
22. During confi rmation hearings the new justices agreed that judges should pay income taxes, and 
during the Court’s renewal, its president Enrique Petracchi said that justices would try to suspend 
this prerogative (“La Corte busca despegarse del fallo que exime a los jueces de tributar,” Página/12, 
April 19, 2006). However, on April 11, 2006, in a case about a claim by a retired judge of a lower court, a 
special formation of the Court, of which the majority of its members had excused themselves, decided 
to maintain this privilege (“Un benefi cio controvertido,” La Nación, April 12, 2006).
23. The respective websites of these offi ces are at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/ovd/ovdhome.jsp and 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/om/index.html.
24. The website of the center is at http://www.cij.gov.ar/inicio.html. Thury Cornejo (2009) analyzes 
other communicative strategies developed by the Supreme Court to foster its institutional image and 
legitimacy.
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New Tendency in the Argentine Court’s Jurisprudence on Rights
The main argument of this article is not centered on the Court’s doctrine, so 
only a short reference to salient decisions on rights is presented,25 and then em-
phasis is placed on cases that show a change in the Court’s competences and pro-
cedures. A thorough assessment of the Supreme Court’s activity regarding the 
enforcement of rights can be found in books and press releases by the Association 
for Civil Rights (e.g., Asociación por los Derechos Civiles [ADC] 2005, 2006, 2008). 
In fact, the work produced by that NGO, specifi cally by its area dedicated to ana-
lyze the Supreme Court and bring it closer to the public,26 is a relevant aspect of 
the new dynamics between civil society and the Court in Argentina.
Some of the Court’s most important decisions on rights after its reform have 
reversed the conservative doctrine of the so-called Menemist Court of the 1990s, 
for example in the area of labor and pension law,27 as well as regarding the con-
stitutional guarantees of defendants in criminal processes.28 In the area of pen-
sion law, the Court issued two main decisions that are particularly important, 
not only for their content and impact on rights but also for their implications for 
the Court’s institutional role. In 2005, in one of these two decisions (the other is 
addressed below), the Court declared that its own jurisdiction as an ordinary tri-
bunal of third instance in matters related to pension law was unconstitutional.29 
At the same time that it corrected an unconstitutional legal reform of the 1990s, 
this decision contributed to reducing the number of cases that the Court must 
deal with each year, allowing it to concentrate on matters that are institutionally 
important (see Litvachky and Zayat 2007). Just one week after this decision by the 
Court, the Senate repealed the questioned norm.30 In the same way, with respect 
to labor law legislation promulgated in the 1990s, and in particular with regard 
to on-the-job accident regulations, it was only after the Court’s intervention and 
declaration that those rules were unconstitutional that legislative proposals to 
change them started to be discussed.31
The Court has also decided a series of cases regarding basic social rights and 
25. The complete text of the current Supreme Court’s decisions, in Spanish only, can be found at the 
Court’s website: http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/cons_fallos.jsp.
26. The website of this area is available at http://www.adc.org.ar/sw_seccion.php?id=127.
27. In 2004, the Court declared unconstitutional a series of regulations implemented during  Menem’s 
government that referred mainly to compensation claims and on-the-job accidents and risks (ADC 
2005).
28. Legal scholar Roberto Gargarella pointed out that this Court will leave a strong imprint in crimi-
nal law and that it has resumed the liberal doctrine of the Court that was developed during President 
Alfonsín’s term (author interview, Buenos Aires, July 5, 2007).
29. Itzcovich, Mabel c/ ANSES s/ reajustes varios, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN), fi le 
I.349.XXXIX (March 29, 2005).
30. In fact, as Sagües (2005) has pointed out, this was the fi rst time that the Court rejected an attribu-
tion assigned to it by the legislative power. The Court acted in this case because of the inaction of Con-
gress, which should have repealed a law that was clearly unconstitutional (Sagües 2005).
31. In this regard, it has been said that “whereas everybody, even businessmen and insurance compa-
nies, knew that the system of safety had many shortcuts, only after the Court’s decision did a legislative 
reform start to be discussed with a sense of urgency” (“Cómo hacer que la Corte tenga un peso propio,” 
Página/12, October 17, 2004).
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has compelled the national and provincial governments to act in cases of extreme 
and urgent need, particularly related to health and food security (see ADC 2006). 
It has also intervened for the fi rst time in the defense of the rights of aboriginal 
communities in Argentina, in two main cases that are further addressed below. 
Among other signifi cant decisions on rights issues, there are two very important 
cases in which the Court decided clearly against the executive’s interest: one of 
these cases dealt with freedom of the press,32 and the other one was a very salient 
decision on freedom of union association.33
New Ways of Judicial Enforcement and Redefi nition of the Institutional Role of the 
Supreme Court
Beyond the mentioned changes in the Court’s jurisprudence on rights, there has 
been an even more signifi cant transformation in its decision-making processes in 
terms of the implications for the Court’s institutional role and standing. In several 
cases, the Court convened public hearings,34 and it accepted amicus curiae briefs 
and the intervention of NGOs as third parties to a case, which allowed for the 
participation of new types of actors in its decision-making process. In some cases, 
the Court has developed new criteria about collective rights and individual rights 
with a collective dimension. Moreover, in two emblematic decisions, it has inter-
vened in structural reform cases, which as Puga (2008) has pointed out, would 
most certainly have been rejected in the past, and it has implemented for the fi rst 
time in the Argentine context procedures that can be related to some of the com-
ponents of the so-called experimental approach in public interest litigation (Sabel 
and Simon 2004).35
In one of its most important decisions in the area of pension law, in 2006, the 
Court upheld the constitutional guarantee of a mobility criterion to determine in-
creases in the amount of pensions.36 It has been noted that initially this decision was 
32. In the decision Editorial Río Negro S.A. c/ Neuquén, Provincia del s/ acción de amparo, CSJN, fi le 
E.1.XXXIX (September 5, 2007), the Court declared unconstitutional the withdrawal of offi cial advertise-
ments from a newspaper as punishment for an editorial line that is critical of the government.
33. In Asociación Trabajadores del Estado c/ Ministerio de Trabajo s/ Ley de Asociaciones Sindicales, CSJN, 
fi le A.201.XL (November 11, 2008) the Court upheld a claim presented by an association of workers 
regarding the right to be elected as a workers’ representative without being affi liated with an offi cially 
recognized union. In this way, the Court opened the door to union plurality, which was against the 
interests of the centralized Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), a key ally of the national govern-
ment (“Histórico fallo de la Corte: Aprobó la libertad sindical,” La Nación, November 18, 2008).
34. Rolando Gialdino, in charge of the labor law division at the Supreme Court, argues that the type 
and number of cases in which the Court holds public hearings “depends on the institutional role the 
Court aims to assume.” He also pointed out, in 2005, that the current Court was holding more public 
hearings than it had held in its whole existence: “It is a new trend, there are three or four hearings per 
year; they are not many, but there is a tendency to use this mechanism” (author interview, Buenos Aires, 
April 29, 2005).
35. As explained by Bergallo (2005, 19), the remedial model generally applied by Argentine judges 
when seeking to repair organizational and institutional causes of harm was based on “the ‘command 
and control’ style of vertical regulation in which a central authority dictates specifi c instructions to 
administrative bureaucracies.”
36. Badaro, Adolfo Valentín c/ Anses s/ ajustes varios, CSJN, fi le B.675.XLI (August 8, 2006).
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against the executive’s interests.37 What was new about this case is that the Court 
did not specify the ratio that should be applied for calculation; instead, it ordered 
the Argentine National Congress to establish a mechanism to increase pensions; 
moreover, the Court established not a deadline but a criterion for a “reasonable 
time” for Congress to act to redress the extant unconstitutional situation. Judge 
Ricardo Lorenzetti explained that this initial decision by the Court in this case was 
“more appropriate for a dialogue between powers,” and he added that the Court 
would monitor compliance with its decision. He also pointed out that this was “an 
innovative measure in our system but a very benefi cial one for the people,” because 
instead of deciding on an individual case, it obliged Congress to reverse a situation 
that affected a great number of citizens.38 However, Congress acted late, promulgat-
ing a law in 2007 that did not comply with the constitutional principle of mobility 
in the amount of pensions (it established a fi xed percentage for all cases). So, the 
Court decided for the individual case and declared that the new norm was uncon-
stitutional. In 2008, the executive sent a new law to Congress establishing a mobility 
mechanism, which was approved in October of that year. It has been argued that 
this law was “a result of successive interventions of the Court and of the dialogical 
stand that it developed with the political powers through its decisions.”39
The Court also intervened for the fi rst time in two cases regarding the appall-
ing living conditions of aboriginal communities in Argentina. In 2007, the na-
tional public defender presented a claim against the national government and El 
Chaco Province for violations of the fundamental rights of Toba communities in 
that province; eleven persons had died of malnutrition in the two months previ-
ous to the claim.40 Considering the gravity of the situation, the Court immediately 
ordered the respective authorities to provide assistance to these communities, 
and it convoked a public hearing before issuing a decision in which it ordered 
that in thirty days the respective governments inform the Court about the imple-
mentation of health, education, potable water, and infrastructure programs in the 
communities. After its decision, the Court held new public hearings to supervise 
the progress of the case. In 2008, the Court upheld a petition by seven indigenous 
communities and an organization of small producers from Salta Province and 
ordered the preventive measure of stopping deforestation of aboriginal lands in 
the province of Salta, which was carried out by big soya entrepreneurs.41 In 2009, 
the Court convoked new public hearings on this case,42 and it accepted an amicus 
brief written by three environmental organizations.43
37. Álvaro Herrero, director of the justice area of the Association for Civil Rights, in “La Corte juega 
fuerte,” La Nación, December 15, 2008.
38. “Es urgente, hay un derecho violado,” Página/12, August 10, 2006.
39. This evaluation was stated in the amicus curiae brief presented by legal scholars before the Su-
preme Court of Buenos Aires, which is mentioned later here.
40. Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación c/ Estado Nacional y otra (Provincia del Chaco) s/ proceso de conoci-
miento, CSJN, fi le D.587.XLIII (September 18, 2007).
41. Salas, Dino y otros c/ Salta, Provincia de y Estado Nacional s/ amparo, CSJN, fi le S.1144.XLIV (Decem-
ber 29, 2008).
42. “Cruce de igual a igual por los desmontes,” Página/12, February 19, 2009.
43. The organizations are Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, Greenpeace, and Fundación 
Vida Silvestre Argentina. The complete text of this brief can be found at the website of the Fundación 
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In addition, in a series of cases the Court has developed new criteria about 
collective cases in which there exists a violation of individual rights that affects 
a group of persons homogeneously.44 This has allowed for the intervention of the 
Court in cases such as a claim presented in 2006 by a group of physicians and 
two professional associations regarding the infrastructure, equipment, and basic 
conditions for functioning of a public hospital in Salta Province.45 In this case 
the Court considered that the precarious situation of that hospital was enough 
to merit the Court’s intervention in the case, and it indicated the provincial high 
court must rectify its previous decision in which it had declared itself incompe-
tent to attend the case.46
Finally, in two cases referring to imprisonment conditions and environmen-
tal damages, the Court upheld collective petitions and intervened in structural 
reform or complex litigation, respectively. These cases are related to structural 
violations of rights, whose solution cannot be addressed on an individual basis 
but require a collective remedy (Courtis 2005). This approach indicates the begin-
ning of a new relationship among the Court, political power and bureaucratic 
agencies, and civil society. It also entails a new way of protecting and enforcing 
rights in Argentina.
In May 2005, the Court upheld a collective proceeding on habeas corpus pre-
sented by the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) on imprisonment condi-
tions in the province of Buenos Aires.47 In its decision, the Court ordered the three 
provincial branches of government to review the legal status and the detention 
conditions of the more than thirty thousand persons under arrest, to adapt them 
to constitutional and international norms. This case is emblematic in terms of the 
implementation of innovative judicial procedures. In the fi rst place, the Court up-
held for the fi rst time a collective habeas corpus brief, which was possible because 
the constitutional reform of 1994 conferred legal standing to NGOs as plaintiffs 
in amparo (emergency judicial relief) and habeas corpus briefs and allowed for the 
use of these remedies to defend rights that have a collective dimension. Second, 
several public hearings were held on this case, and for the fi rst time the Court 
accepted amicus curiae briefs, which several organizations submitted.48 Third, in 
this case the Court introduced two innovations to the enforcement of public poli-
cies, as well as in its own role in their implementation, which are related to experi-
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, at http://www.farn.org.ar/prensa/gacetillas2009/amicus_salta300709
.html.
44. A defi nition by the Supreme Court of this type of case can be found in Halabi, Ernesto c/ P.E.N. Ley 
25.873 Dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986, CSJN, fi le H.270.XLII (February 24, 2009).
45. Ministerio de Salud y/o Gobernación s/ acción de amparo, CSJN, fi le M.291.XL (October 31, 2006).
46. Other important collective cases upheld by the Court are Monner Sans, Ricardo c/ Fuerza Aérea Ar-
gentina s/ amparo Ley 16.986, CSJN, fi le M.2975.XXXVIII (September 6, 2006); Asociación Civil Mujeres por 
la Vida, CSJN, fi le M.970.XXXIX (October 31, 2006); and Defensoría del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires 
c/ Secretaría de Comunicaciones, CSJN, fi le D.859.XXXVI (October 31, 2006).
47. Verbitsky, Horacio s/ habeas corpus, CSJN, fi le V.856.XXXVIII (May 3, 2005).
48. The organizations that intervened in this case were the Comisión Nacional de Juristas, Asocia-
ción por los Derechos Civiles, Clínica Jurídica de Interés Público de Córdoba, El Ágora, Casa del Libe-
rado, Centro de Comunicación Popular y Asesoramiento Legal, Human Rights Watch, and Organiza-
ción Mundial contra la Tortura.
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mentalism. On the one hand, the Court’s decision did not impose the measures 
that other powers should implement, but it established parameters to evaluate the 
improvement in the situation and indicated the obligation of the different powers 
to act in order to comply with them. Moreover, it established that a permanent 
discussion panel be formed between the provincial authorities and civil society 
organizations, to defi ne courses of action and to supervise the development of 
this case. On the other hand, the Court assumed for the fi rst time a continuing 
controlling and monitoring role of its decision, by requiring that the monitoring 
board present a report every sixty days and that the government of Buenos Aires 
present, also every sixty days, a report on the measures it had adopted to improve 
the situation of detainees.
As a consequence of the Court’s intervention in this case, there was a signifi -
cant reduction in the imprisonment rate in the province of Buenos Aires; previ-
ously, the rate had been one of the highest in Latin America, surpassed only by 
Chile (Borda and Pol 2007). As a result of this decision, in 2006 the legislature 
of the province of Buenos Aires reformed the incarceration rules according to 
the Court’s requirements; moreover, courts in other provinces had changed their 
jurisprudence, and the judicial power had made changes to its practices as well.49 
However, according to CELS, until 2007 there was progress being made in this 
case, but since governor Daniel Scioli took offi ce, overpopulation and conditions 
in jails have worsened.50 In attending CELS’s claim, in February 2010 the Court 
required the Supreme Court of Buenos Aires to intervene in the case. In August 
2010 a group of legal scholars presented an amicus curiae brief to the Buenos 
Aires provincial court.51 In alluding to the diffi culties in implementing remedies 
in this case, a member of CELS explained, “If this case is considered as one more 
case of litigation, it can be argued that the Court’s decision has not been fulfi lled; 
but in structural litigation we are dealing with a process that depends on the rela-
tive power and the relationship between different actors and institutions, and the 
Court’s intervention is a point of departure, and a long time is needed to evaluate 
if it has been successful.”52
In a case regarding pollution of the basin of the Matanza-Riachuelo River in 
the city of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires, in 2006 the Court upheld a 
claim presented by residents of that area in which they denounced severe envi-
ronmental damages caused by the numerous industries located along the river, as 
well as by other pollution sources, which had been allowed by the inaction of the 
three governmental levels with jurisdiction over that area.53 The Court considered 
49. Rodrigo Borda, lawyer in the program Institutional Violence and Citizens’ Security, CELS (author 
interview, Buenos Aires, June 20, 2007).
50. “Tienen condiciones inhumanas,” Página/12, March 10, 2010.
51. The complete text of this brief can be found at the website of the Universidad de Palermo, at 
http://www.palermo.edu/Archivos_content/derecho/pdf/Amicus-Curae.pdf.
52. Paula Litvachky, director of the area Democratic Justice, CELS (author interview, Buenos Aires, 
June 15, 2007).
53. The claim was against the national, provincial, and municipal governments as well as against 
forty-four businesses.
P5963.indb   32 10/26/12   1:55:57 PM
INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES 33
the right to a safe environment to be a collective right; it accepted the partici-
pation as third parties of several organizations whose institutional goals were 
related to environmental issues;54 and it held several public hearings with govern-
mental authorities, businesses, and NGOs. As in the formerly alluded-to case, in 
this case the Court did not establish the policies that should be implemented but 
indicated that the three governmental levels involved, as well as the manufactur-
ers, should reach an agreement on a long-term plan to improve the situation. In 
2006, in response to the Court’s intervention, the national government promoted 
the creation of an institutional structure (the Interjurisdictional Basin Authority), 
which was established by federal law.55 Also in that year, the National Secretary of 
Environment presented a plan to remedy the situation, and the Court mandated 
the intervention of the University of Buenos Aires to evaluate the plan’s viability.56 
In several public hearings, the Court severely questioned the national govern-
ment’s lack of action in this case,57 and after a long process it issued a verdict.58 
Since then it has continued holding public hearings to control the development of 
governmental policies and business activities in this area.
The cases presented here have important implications for the redefi nition of 
the Court’s institutional role and standing. To begin with, in the two latter cases, 
the Court accepted new types of claims and claimants, that is, complex litigation 
through collective proceedings.59 In addition, in several rights-based cases, the 
Court started to implement new procedures established or formalized through 
recent reforms to its internal procedures. In particular, it promoted public hear-
ings and the reception of amicus curiae briefs, which allow for the participation 
of new types of actors in the Court’s decision-making processes. The Court has 
also introduced innovative procedural forms. In effect, in several of these cases, 
it did not establish the policies that other powers should implement but opened a 
process of dialogue among different types of actors. It set standards, parameters, 
and time limits that other powers should comply with, and it mandated the adap-
tation of legislation or the formulation of programs. Instead of closing the cases 
with a conclusive decision, the Court initiated a long-term process for the imple-
mentation of policies that should be defi ned by the diverse actors involved. In 
this sense, it has been remarked that in some cases the Court has not established 
54. This legal resource is established by article 90 of the National Civil and Commercial Procedural 
Code (Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación). The organizations that intervened in this case 
were Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, Fundación Greenpeace Argentina, Fundación Metro-
politana, Fundación Ciudad, Poder Ciudadano, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, and Asociación 
Vecinos de La Boca.
55. Law No. 26,168 (Ley de la Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo) was promulgated by the National Congress 
on November 15, 2006.
56. “Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo: Plan presentado por las autoridades estatales—Factibilidad; Inter-
vención de la Universidad de Buenos Aires,” LexisNexis Argentina, February 23, 2007.
57. “El plan de saneamiento del Riachuelo ante la Corte,” Página/12, July 5, 2007.
58. Mendoza, Beatriz S. y otros c/ Estado Nacional, Provincia de Buenos Aires y ciudad autónoma de Buenos 
Aires s/ daños y perjuicios, CSJN, fi le M.1569.XL (July 8, 2008).
59. In this sense, Juan González Bertomeu, member of the area Poder Judicial–Corte Suprema, ADC, 
observed, “Never before would the Argentine Court have accepted a structural litigation claim” (author 
interview, Buenos Aires, June 8, 2007).
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 “direct solutions, but rather experimental remedies, in search of agreement be-
tween the parties.”60
Through these decisions the Court has intervened in signifi cant institutional 
issues and has established relations and obligations among different powers. In 
particular, it has forced the national Congress to promulgate or repeal legislation 
about pension and labor rights, and it has mandated the legislature of the prov-
ince of Buenos Aires to modify its legislation on imprisonment conditions. It has 
also ordered the other levels of the judicial power to change their jurisprudence 
and practices, in particular regarding rights in criminal processes and incarcera-
tion conditions. Furthermore, the Court mandated that the national executive 
power create an institutional structure (the Interjurisdictional Basin Authority) 
and develop a long-term governmental plan to solve environmental problems in 
cases of river contamination.
This type of approach entails a new standing of the Court and has implications 
in terms of deliberative practices and democratic principles. It is an example of 
the way in which a judicial organ may intervene in public policy and the enforce-
ment of social rights without imposing a defi nite course of political action on 
democratically elected powers. Legal scholar Roberto Gargarella has observed 
that this Court has a “more procedural vision, a dialogic style of non-imposition, 
promoted by some of its justices,” and he added that, whereas “in substantive 
terms this Court is different from the former one [composed by a Menemist ma-
jority], in procedural terms it is also different from the Court under Alfonsín’s 
government.”61 Its role in these cases contributes to keeping the Court away from 
countermajoritarian objections, and in this way it may also foster its own legiti-
macy. For example, regarding the Court’s decision on imprisonment conditions, a 
member of the main NGO that intervened in the case observed that the approach 
developed by the Court “was one of the reasons why this decision didn’t gener-
ate adverse reactions.”62 In this regard, Justice Eugenio Zaffaroni argued that this 
Court “has been very prudent and careful, because it hasn’t told the other pow-
ers the concrete solution to be adopted, acknowledging in this way the space of 
political discussion and decision that is inherent to other powers. With extreme 
care, the Court has limited itself to indicate that a response to certain problems 
couldn’t be ignored or omitted.”63
The fact that the Court has adopted an active and continuing monitoring role 
with respect to the other powers’ action in cases of structural litigation implies 
an innovative accountability mechanism in Argentina and a new standing of the 
60. Juan González Bertomeu, member of the area Poder Judicial–Corte Suprema, ADC (author inter-
view, Buenos Aires, June 8, 2007).
61. Roberto Gargarella, legal scholar (author interview, Buenos Aires, July 5, 2007).
62. Rodrigo Borda, lawyer in the program Institutional Violence and Citizens’ Security, CELS (author 
interview, Buenos Aires, June 20, 2007).
63. “La Corte juega fuerte,” La Nación, December 15, 2008. In the same sense, legal scholar Ricardo 
Gil Lavedra expressed that “the Court is taking the fi rst steps in the formulation of new institutional 
relations between powers. This is a kind of ‘dialogue’ that favors deliberation and preserves democratic 
mandates. So far, the Court has acted with prudence and moderation but has shown its determination 
and that it is willing to assume an active role in the protection of rights” (“Un nuevo actor en escena,” 
La Nación, December 15, 2008).
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Court with regard to the protection of constitutional rights and guarantees. It is 
an incipient tendency but a signifi cant one in the history of the Court. Finally, as 
Puga (2008) has noted, beyond the auspicious perspectives opened by the inter-
vention of the Court in structural cases and given the complexity of these cases, 
one of the main questions that remains open is whether an agreement will fi nally 
be reached among the different actors involved to redress the situations in which 
these violations of rights originate.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE REDEFINITION 
OF THE COURT’S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
The rationales that explain judicial behavior based on divided government 
or electoral uncertainty are not suffi cient for understanding the Court’s actions 
since its reform in 2003. On the one hand, government was not divided during 
this period: from the fi rst months of Kirchner’s presidency, the government had 
legislative support in both chambers,64 strengthened its support base in Congress 
in the midterm elections of 2005 (Calvo 2005), and won fi rst-round presidential 
elections in 2007. In addition, there was no real electoral uncertainty, as polls indi-
cated that the government had a strong probability of winning elections in 2007.65 
On the other hand, it would be hard to argue that the Court acted in the way it 
did because of its dependence on a strong executive. In this regard, it has been 
remarked that the new justices were not identifi ed with any political faction or 
interest group close to the government,66 and that this was “an independent and 
technically competent Supreme Court as we have seldom had in our history.”67 It 
has also been pointed out that, even if on many occasions the Court’s decisions 
did not contradict the executive’s policy orientation, the decisions have expanded 
“the public agenda, especially the government’s, as no other force either in parlia-
ment or in the opposition can do.”68 Finally, in some signifi cant cases the Court 
decided overtly against the executive’s interests.69 In fact, another type of study 
would be necessary to systematically analyze the Court’s behavior in terms of its 
64. Despite the fact that Kirchner was elected with only 22 percent of the vote, as Levitsky and 
Murillo (2003, 164) point out, neither of the several factions into which the Partido Justicialista was 
divided during the electoral race had a majority in either chamber, and “during the fi rst weeks of Kirch-
ner’s government the [Partido Justicialista’s] legislative faction reunifi ed and the vast majority of party 
bosses . . . came together behind a new party leadership.”
65. “Otras dos encuestas dan a Kirchner y a Cristina arriba,” Clarín, March 5, 2007.
66. Hernán Gullco, coordinator of the area Justice and Public Litigation, ADC (author interview, Bue-
nos Aires, April 19, 2005).
67. Roberto Gargarella, “Corte: Polémica justifi cación para decisiones clave,” Clarín, July 30, 2007.
68. “El tren bala institucional,” Página/12, October 17, 2004.
69. Besides the two important cases on the rights of freedom of the press and liberty of union as-
sociation, in a 2004 case that was pivotal to the government’s interests, the Court ruled against the 
government, deciding that the reform the constitution of Santiago del Estero, which was the main goal 
of federal intervention in that province, was unconstitutional (see Brinks 2005). In two cases from 2007 
and 2008, respectively, the Court upheld the right of two former high offi cials accused of human rights 
violations during the previous dictatorship to assume offi ce as elected deputies; it has been claimed 
that in these cases the Court reaffi rmed its independence with respect to the national government 
(ADC 2008).
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independence. However, it can be asserted that the Court has not been accused 
so far of being subservient to political power or to other types of actors. So, the 
explanations based on party competition do not seem to adequately explain why 
in this context the Court assumed a new role in public policy and rights cases, 
setting an agenda and compelling other powers to act on issues that the political 
branches of government were not attending to and issuing some decisions that 
contradicted the executive’s will.
This article argues instead that after a serious institutional crisis, the new Court 
needed to recompose its institutional legitimacy and that it did so fi rst by intro-
ducing new mechanisms to increase public participation and accountability—
which, as already mentioned, had been proposed by NGOs—and, later, by de-
veloping new ways of decision making that incorporated social actors and cre-
ated new forms of intervention by the Court in salient public policy and rights 
cases. This argument is based on contextually confi gured incentives that made 
the Court’s legitimacy a central concern for justices, as well as for other actors 
in the political system. This case shows that concerns about the legitimacy of a 
court may become more salient at certain junctures, and that courts’ actions may 
be infl uenced by them. As noted earlier, immediately after the Court’s renewal, 
justices were willing to develop new relationships with social actors that were 
positioned as relevant interlocutors regarding the Court’s reform. In effect, in-
fl uential NGOs in the context of the 2001–2002 crisis found an opportunity to 
advance a series of proposals for change in the Court that have been upheld and 
implemented almost in their entirety by the government and the Court since 
2003. Subsequently, the work of these organizations contributed to the Court’s 
opening to new procedures, new types of cases, and innovative ways of judi-
cial enforcement, thus infl uencing the Court’s agenda. The Court, again, was 
willing to uphold judicial claims by social actors and to pursue new strategies 
of intervention in new types of cases. In this way, new approaches to decision 
making can be seen as the result of a process that involved citizens’ proposals, 
the Court’s institutional changes to its own procedures, citizens’ participation 
in the Court’s processes through new institutional mechanisms, and the Court’s 
upholding of new types of cases and implementation of new ways of judicial 
enforcement.
As has been discussed, NGOs’ proposals for the Court’s reform were framed 
as a way to enhance the Court’s legitimacy. Signifi cantly, justices themselves have 
manifested their concern about the need to rebuild the legitimacy of the judiciary 
and of the Court in particular. When elected as the Court’s president in November 
2003, Judge Enrique Petracchi remarked that one of the priorities of the Court was 
“to improve the image of the justice system and the Supreme Court,” and he com-
mented that his colleagues shared this aim.70 One of his fi rst actions after his elec-
tion was to meet with those NGOs to discuss institutional reforms for the Court. 
The Court’s vice president since September 2005, Judge Elena Highton, expressed 
that “judges need to be recognized by society because citizens have to recover 
70. “Petracchi, felicitado por el Presidente,” La Nación, November 19, 2003.
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their trust in institutions.”71 In one of his fi rst public statements as the current 
president of the Court, Judge Ricardo Lorenzetti said, “The judiciary has suffered 
a crisis of confi dence, which must urgently be restored by means of suitable ges-
tures and measures, bearing in mind the delicate institutional role of judges as the 
guardians of the rights of all citizens.”72 Justice Carmen Argibay responded, “This 
Court is committed to the people. We have worked hard to implement public 
hearings. . . . [W]e have intervened in very important cases, such as in the recov-
ery of the Riachuelo, the offi ce for the assistance of victims of domestic violence.”73 
As part of the new understanding of the role of judges, Justice Eugenio Zaffaroni 
mentioned that it is important for the people “to know about the debates and posi-
tions among judges and to exert as much public control over the judiciary as over 
any other power.”74
In this context, the new types of cases and procedures that the Court has de-
veloped have been understood as part of the Court’s efforts to establish itself as 
a legitimate and meaningful actor. Legal scholar Roberto Gargarella explained, 
“The Court assumes the Riachuelo as an exemplary case, and what is impressive 
about it is that, without imposing a policy decision, it obligates public offi cials 
and industries. They act because they are very concerned about repositioning the 
Court as a respectable actor.”75 Legal scholar and ADC member Juan González 
Bertomeu pointed out, “This Court needs to re-legitimate its role, and it does so 
where it can. The challenge is that the Court has to face a strong government, so 
it chooses cases of public impact”; he added that in structural reform cases, “the 
Court has much to gain. The Riachuelo case can be the most important case in 
its history.”76 In the same vein, Andrea Pochak, adjunct director of CELS, argued, 
“The Court’s decision about imprisonment conditions in the politically most im-
portant Argentine province shows the Court’s interest in becoming a signifi cant 
political actor.”77 With regard to the Court’s relationship with society in general, it 
has been claimed that “the current Court has made some efforts to be accessible to 
people, to communicate more than the previous justices, to be done with enigmas 
and secrets.”78 Finally, several actors have acknowledged the more dialogic ap-
proach of the Court to certain cases as a new positioning of the Court regarding 
other powers and as part of a new understanding of its mission, which implies 
neither recusing itself in very sensitive public policy issues that imply gross viola-
tions of citizens’ rights nor imposing a fi xed course of action on democratically 
elected powers.
71. Presentation of Judge Elena Highton at the First National Conference of Judges, Santa Fe, March 
2006, http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/verdoc.jsp (accessed September 2010).
72. Second National Conference of Judges, Salta, August 2007, available at the website of Revista Pen-
samiento Penal, http://www.pensamientopenal.com.ar/01102007/Lorenzetti.pdf.
73. “Argibay: ‘La Corte actúa en muchos temas porque el Estado está ausente,’” Perfi l, No. 0323, De-
cember 21, 2008.
74. “El fi n de la misa en latín y de espaldas,” Página/12, June 6, 2010.
75. Author interview, Buenos Aires, July 5, 2007.
76. Author interview, Buenos Aires, June 8, 2007.
77. Author interview, Buenos Aires, June 8, 2005.
78. Mario Wainfeld, “Los mensajes y los silencios,” Página/12, April 13, 2008.
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The reform proposals described here, as well as the remarks from academics, 
NGO members, and justices, show that the main concern regarding the need to 
redefi ne the role of the Court was that it be defi ned not around a certain policy 
orientation but around a new standing of the Court regarding civil society and 
the political system in general. The means to change this standing were related to 
disclosure and accountability and to a new kind of relationship of the Court with 
other actors and powers. The Court had lost prestige not only for its evident de-
pendence on political power but also because of the opaqueness of its procedures. 
As part of its institutional reform, the Court modifi ed its internal mechanisms, 
allowing for more participation and disclosure of its procedures, as NGOs had 
proposed. After those reforms, the Court, accompanied by NGOs, implemented 
those mechanisms in concrete cases and through innovative decision making. In 
this way, the action of the Court after reforms was driven, at least to some extent, 
by the same dynamics and claims that were relevant at the moment of reform. In 
particular, the new role of the Court can be attributed to the type of institutional 
crisis that motivated its reform—which generated incentives for judges to pay 
special attention to the Court’s legitimacy—and to the same type of actors that 
had pushed for institutional change.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that, after its reform in 2003, the Argentine Supreme 
Court started to redefi ne its own competences and to adopt an active and innova-
tive role in the implementation of some signifi cant decisions in the fi eld of public 
policy and rights. The consequences of the Court’s decisions for its legitimacy 
and institutional standing illustrate how the empowerment of courts is related 
not only to their formal structure and competences but also to their actions and 
way of functioning.
The Court was aware of the need to redefi ne its role and gain public recogni-
tion, implemented new internal mechanisms oriented toward increasing public 
participation and accountability in its procedures. Subsequently, it developed 
new ways of decision making that in some relevant instances incorporated the 
claims of social actors and upheld the participation of those actors in its decisional 
processes. The search for institutional legitimacy explains both the creation of 
new internal mechanisms and the subsequent use of the new procedures by the 
Court.
The analysis of this case shows that some signifi cant actions and ways of func-
tioning of the Argentine Supreme Court are related to the types of actors and 
claims that were signifi cant in its reform process. This article does not argue that 
there exists a causal relationship between both processes but that the way courts 
build their roles may depend on the same factors that led to their reform in the 
fi rst place.
Finally, this case suggests that through innovative and more participative 
procedures, new constitutional courts may start intervening in public policy and 
rights issues without making themselves vulnerable to countermajoritarian prob-
lems. This is a signifi cant issue particularly for courts that have to defi ne their 
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roles in contexts signed by profound social inequalities, as in most Latin Ameri-
can cases.
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